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Abstract
In this paper, we report data from interviews with members of conservative political
clubs at four flagship public universities. First, we categorize these students into three
analytically distinct orientations regarding Donald Trump and his presidency (or what
we call Trumpism). There are principled rejecters, true believers, and satisficed
partisans. We argue that Trumpism is a disunifying symbol in our respondents’ self-
narratives. Specifically, right-leaning collegians use Trumpism to draw distinctions
over the appropriate meaning of conservatism. Second, we show how political clubs
sort and shape orientations to Trumpism. As such, our work reveals how student-led
groups can play a significant role in making different political discourses available on
campuses and shaping the types of activism pursued by club members—both of
which have potentially serious implications for the content and character of American
democracy moving forward.
Keywords Americanpolitics .Conservatism.Culture .Highereducation. Identity.Organizations
Introduction
Donald Trump, first as a candidate and now as the president, has been an exceptionally
divisive force in American politics, even among conservatives who typically vote Republican.
This has been especially true on college campuses. During the 2016 election, several notable
chapters of the College Republicans (e.g., at Harvard and Pennsylvania State University)
formally broke with their party over Trump’s nomination (Pager 2016). And, across the board,
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whether college-educated or not, people under the age of 30 tend to hold strongly negative
views of the president (Kamarck et al. 2018). Indeed, Trump’s most vocal base is comprised of
older blue-collar workers without college degrees (Pew Research Center 2018).
Universities, therefore, are not a natural fit for Trumpism.1 Yet, plenty of right-leaning
collegians support the president and his administration (Chason 2016; Godfrey 2018). Some
students, much like his older blue-collar base, are inspired by his iconoclastic style and are
energized by his agenda. Others are more reticent in their approval, but they still prefer Trump
over any Democratic candidate. And then there are conservative students who vow they will
never support the 45th president or his vision for the country. In this paper, we expand on these
three orientations to Trumpism: true belief, satisficed partisanship, and principled rejection. We
then argue that the political clubs these collegians join on their campuses serve as “microcul-
tures” (Perrin 2005), which shape members’ discourse on Trumpism.
Much has already been written about Trump’s appeal to the white working class (e.g., Ball
2018; Dreher 2016; Hochschild 2016). The president’s significance for more affluent conser-
vatives is less understood—despite the fact that it is these Republican voters who actually
elected him to office (Carnes and Lupu 2017). If Trump’s cultural resonance comes from
connecting with the “forgotten man” (see Berezin 2017; Gidron and Hall 2017; Lamont et al.
2017), then what are we to make of the support he garners from the better-off and the
privileged? The conservative students in our study fall into these latter categories. They attend
four of the nation’s best public universities, even if some of them come from rather humble
backgrounds. They are on promising career paths. They are also politically-engaged, “active
citizens” (Braunstein 2017), and their club memberships have given them social connections to
highly resourced foundations, think tanks, and other organizations beyond their universities’
gates (Binder and Wood 2013). All of this is to say, they are set to be the winners—not the
losers—in a post-industrial global order (Murray 2012). Yet, the majority of our conservative
interviewees support the president. Why?
Part of the answer may be protecting their race-based privileges. As analysts have demon-
strated, racial minorities in the working class have not been drawn to Trump’s messaging, but a
substantial portion of poor and wealthy whites alike are (Bhambra 2017). That is, the
president’s forgotten man narrative is couched in identity politics, and his electoral success
relies on racial resentment (Sides et al. 2018). As such, Trumpism is powered by an econom-
ically diverse coalition of white voters (Kitschelt and Rehm 2019). But an explanation of white
aggrievement, when applied to our qualitative data from collegians in conservative political
clubs, is incomplete (also see Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2016).
The vast majority of Trump supporters that we talked with did not articulate a sense of
racial resentment when describing their views on American democracy.2 Of course, the ability
to downplay Trump’s racist pronouncements and ignore the real-life harm of his immigration
1 To quote Tabachnick (2016), “Obviously, Trumpism is linked to the person Donald Trump, but its roots run
much deeper, intertwining contemporary and traditional political trends in such a way that makes it both uniquely
American and of the twenty-first century […].” Its characteristics include “distillations of much more compli-
cated phenomena” that can be summarized as a mix of celebrity, nativism, outsider status, and populism. We use
the term “Trumpism” in this paper to capture respondents’ views on Trump as a person, as well as his
administration overall, including the federal appointments that have taken place under his watch, his style of
governance, policy positions, and so on.
2 Only one interviewee explicitly linked his support of Trumpism to white aggrievement. This respondent blamed
immigration for the economic downturn in his hometown and lamented what he believed were the much higher
standards applied to white applicants of his university. However, his responses are the exception that prove the
rule in how Trump supporters framed their political viewpoints in our interviews.
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and domestic policies depends on white privilege (Coates 2017), and it may well be that in
other contexts—such as on message boards or discussions among peers—these students would
lean into more racialized pronouncements. Regardless, our respondents did not express their
political viewpoints in these terms with us. Our goal in this paper is to analyze the discursive
practices used in the construction of conservative social identities on college campus—not to
examine the race-based privileges undergirding these narratives, fitting though they may be
(cf. Kidder 2018). Instead, we will show that discussions about the president and his admin-
istration were a way for right-leaning students to promote what they felt were the most valued
images of the self within the interview setting (Zussman 1996). And, in doing so, our
conversations with collegians reveal the ways symbols (in this case, Trumpism) can be used
to build different types of social identities (Tajfel 1974). Further, we propose that political
clubs offer a unique opportunity to study discursive practices linking (or unlinking) identities
to particular meanings (in this case, “real” conservatism). Specifically, we argue that instead of
being an “anchor” for cultural coherence (Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011), Trumpism serves to
divide young conservatives. Unlike Republicans in Congress, who at the time of this writing
continue to rally around the president for fear of losing their seats, Trumpism unsettles the
identity claims of students, as divergent meanings between members of political clubs come
into conflict time and again.
When Culture Leads to Incoherence
Over the last two decades, social scientists have moved away from assumptions that culture is
either tightly unified (e.g., see Geertz 1973; Schneider 1976) or irreconcilably jumbled (e.g.,
see Abu-Lughod 1991; Crapanzano 1986). The dominant perspective in sociology now hinges
on a notion of nominal (but rather resilient) forms of correspondence across cultural phenom-
ena (DiMaggio 1997). Sewell (1999) refers to this as “thin coherence.” In this view, differ-
ences engendered through competing actions, beliefs, and values can still be organized through
anchors (Swidler 2001). That is, a shared community of meaning can be sustained through
recurring and interconnected practices and discourses that allow for dialogue across divergent
constituencies. For example, Ghaziani and Baldassarri (2011) show how a theme of “commu-
nity building” has historically served as an anchor with broad enough consensus among LGBT
activists to hold otherwise disparate groups together as they organized marches in Washington,
DC.
Similarly, Perrin et al. (2014) argue that American conservatism is comprised of thinly
cohered ideologies. There is great potential for opposition between factions. Libertarians,
for instance, desire limitations to governmental oversight at the same time that Christian
fundamentalists push for new social regulations. More than a mere coalition of political
convenience (e.g., Zernike 2010), Perrin and his co-authors propose that the identity of
being “conservative” (see Gross et al. 2011; Mason 2018) anchors heterogeneous modes
of thought. The upshot is that ordinary citizens aligned with the Republican Party have a
diverse (and possibly contradictory) ideological repertoire in which to form their opinions
and policy preferences—all of which are organized under the valued self-image of being a
conservative (Kidder 2016).
The tensions within right-leaning social movements are adeptly revealed in Braunstein’s
(2017) study of the Patriots, a grassroots Tea Party group. Members had differing views on
how to hold politicians accountable, and they disputed their proper relationship to the
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Republican Party (not to mention the clashes of personality within the group). Reading
Braunstein’s research with Swidler’s (2001) eye towards anchors, though, the US Constitution
can be seen as a unifying symbol for the Patriots—giving coherence to their practices and
discourses (see especially Braunstein 2017, 59–65; also see Skocpol and Williamson 2012).
Members bought pocket-sized versions of the Constitution and carried it with them. They
made frequent references to the document, often pulling out their copies to consult passages.
They read aloud from it. The Constitution, in other words, was a major component in the
Patriots’ shared community of meaning. Even in the face of other disagreements, their
recurring use of the Constitution as a symbol helped integrate varied activities with other
Tea Party themes, which ultimately led to a sense of coherence within the group and between
related organizations.
Less understood from the literature, though, are the inevitable strains placed on thin
coherence. We know contradictions and disagreements abound, and researchers have
chronicled divisiveness within social movements (e.g., Blee 2012; Carson 1981; Waite
2001). Ghaziani (2008) even shows the potential benefits of infighting—its presence can
encourage participants to articulate what activism means to them. Our analysis, however, takes
us in a different direction. We focus on a singularly potent symbol of disunity, one in which
individuals grapple with its current significance and future implications. Specifically, we argue
that Trumpism unsettles the thin coherence existing between conservative political clubs
operating in the space of higher education. There is much that still anchors right-leaning
collegians together—such as practices and discourses around themes of personal indepen-
dence, the power of free markets, and the value of tradition. But student-led groups that might
otherwise bond on issues tied to these anchors are (at least partially) unmoored by Trumpism.
As such, we highlight a thin coherence wrought too spindly to find common cause. Differences
over the president and his administration pull club members in separate directions as they
construct narratives about their conservative social identities. These disagreements are about
more than policy debates or disputes over specific issues. Trumpism serves as an overarching
symbol for how students on the right understand themselves and their peers. While much will
inevitably change between now and the next election, our interviews reveal—in situ—young
people struggling over the heart and soul of the Republican Party and its undergirding
ideology, conservatism.
Data and Methods
Data for this paper come from semi-structured interviews with 26 conservative college
students who are (or were) active members of either College Republicans (CRs), Turning
Point USA (TPUSA), or a libertarian group at their schools. These data are a subset of a larger
sample of 77 politically-engaged collegians from across the ideological spectrum.3 Discus-
sions with students took place during the first complete school year Trump was in office (the
fall 2017 and spring 2018 semesters). We interviewed matriculants at the University of
Arizona, the University of Colorado Boulder, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
and the University of Virginia. All four are the flagship schools in their university systems. We
selected these states because they are considered toss-ups in presidential elections. In 2016,
3 Our full project (N = 113) also includes representatives from off-campus political organizations, as well as
administrators, faculty, and staff at our selected schools.
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Colorado and Virginia voted narrowly for Hillary Clinton, while Arizona and North Carolina
went by slim margins for Trump. Subsequent elections—especially the 2018 midterms—
further highlighted their status as “in play” for either party. We focus on CRs, TPUSA, and
libertarian groups4 in this paper because they represent the three most prevalent types of
conservative club memberships at our field sites. Over three-fourths of our right-leaning
interviewees belong to at least one of these student-led groups (26 out of 34).5 In the
examination of Trumpism provided here, variations between chapters of the same club on
different campuses are less relevant than the similarities of chapters across schools. As such,
we discuss them collectively for this paper. Campus- and state-level analyses will be part of
future reports on our larger sample.
Nearly all of the 26 respondents in our conservative club subset are traditional college
students between the ages of 19 and 23 (at the time of the interviews). Our oldest student
interviewee was 28; another was 25. Based on the family descriptions they provided, 16 of this
group are from a professional elite background. Seven are from the middle class. Three are
from the working class. We had one Latinx respondent and another considers himself bi-racial
(with one parent of Asian descent). The rest are white. Ten are women. Based on firsthand
observations of conservative college groups, reviews of the clubs’ official social media posts,
as well as past research on right-leaning college students (Binder and Wood 2013; Kidder
2016, 2018), we assume the dearth of minorities in our data is representative of typical club
memberships, while women are probably overrepresented in our subset. Which is to say,
student-led groups on the right are disproportionately populated by white men.6
Students were contacted via their university email addresses (as listed on the official
websites for their clubs) or through contact information on their groups’ Facebook pages.
Additional respondents were snowballed through referrals. Interviews lasted between one and
two hours and covered a variety of topics—from their thoughts about the 2016 presidential
election to their relationships with professors to the inner workings of their political clubs.
Most interviews were conducted in public areas on campus (e.g., libraries or food courts).
Some were done off school grounds in nearby coffee shops. Several interviews took place in
borrowed university office spaces. Three interviews from the conservative club subset could
not be arranged during our campus visits and were carried out over the phone. We had the
interviews professionally transcribed, and then we coded them for recurring themes and topics.
4 There is no single libertarian organization that stands out in our data. Instead, we found a mix of sponsored
chapters and locally independent clubs across our field sites. At the national level, Young Americans for Liberty
claims to be the largest libertarian organization mobilizing college students. However, at the University of
Virginia, Students for Individual Liberty was the premier libertarian group. They received support from Students
for Liberty, a different national libertarian organization. Conversely, at the University of Arizona, we talked with
students associated with Strive—an organization promoting the objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand. Rand was
not a libertarian, but her ideas have greatly impacted libertarianism. And the Strive members we interviewed self-
identified as libertarians. Despite the students in our sample being affiliated with different organizations, they
described their relationship to politics in very similar ways. As such, we have lumped the libertarian groups
together for this analysis.
5 With the exception of two students who were on American Enterprise Institute’s Executive Council for their
respective universities, the right-leaning students removed from this paper’s analysis did not share membership in
similar conservative clubs. Three were unaffiliated with a campus-based political club, two were part of separate
transpartisan dialogue groups, and one was a member of Christians United for Israel.
6 For example, at a University of Virginia CR meeting we attended, of the approximately 25 students present, six
were women and three were non-white (based on phenotype). At the same time, our interviews with progressive
college students in the larger project (while diverse in gender) also skews white (although, not as strongly). Much
of this racial over- and under-representation results from the predominance of whites at our four field sites.
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For this paper, we pull from sections of the interviews in which respondents discuss their club
memberships, their thoughts and feelings about the president or his administration, and
comments about their right-leaning peers.
As co-PIs, we split the interviewing responsibilities. Amy is a white woman in her mid-50s.
Jeff is a white man in his early-40s. Our age (which influences our clothing styles, mannerism,
etc.), along with our occupation, set us apart from the students we talked with. Further, for
conservatives, our status as professors (sociologists no less) marked us as outsiders (Kelly-
Woessner and Woessner 2006). However, we have previous experience studying students on
the right. We are conversant with conservative issues, and we are comfortable in such
discussions. Thus, while our identities inevitably shaped the situational dynamics (Mishler
1986), we created an interview setting that allowed our respondents to elaborate on their
viewpoints and guide the conversation as they saw fit—which gave us the opportunity to
capture the ways that their self-narratives were constructed.
We use pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of our interviewees. We told students that
we would obscure their identifying information, but that we intended to include the real name
of their university and club memberships in any written or presented work. Everyone that sat
down with us demonstrated an interest in speaking openly about their opinions, although some
opted to go “off the record” for some answers. The decision to reveal the schools and student-
led groups we studied is not completely novel, but it is uncommon. We believe it is justified for
our project because each university and club is distinctive in its traditions and organizational
features. Brackets are used to indicate places in which we have added, altered, or removed
sections of quoted text for clarity or confidentiality.
Typologizing Trumpism on College Campuses
It is not surprising that none of the progressives we interviewed for our larger project aligned
themselves with Trumpism. Our conversations with students on the right, though, illuminate a
much more nuanced political terrain. Collegians who backed the president and his adminis-
tration all identified as conservatives, and they saw themselves (at least to some degree) as in-
step with the Republican Party. However, Trumpism has pushed many conservatives—in and
outside academia—into a period of self-reflection (e.g., see Boot 2018; Flake 2017; Will
2019), and we can see this introspection throughout our data. In the course of our research, we
met many right-leaning students who were principled rejecters of Trumpism. We also talked to
many who connected with the presidency, but their support took very different forms—from
true belief to satisficed partisanship. Our goal in this paper is to offer a sociological framework,
informed by research on identity and organizations, to interpret conservative students’ differ-
ing views on the president and his administration. In this section we provide a typology of
Trumpism on college campuses. This is followed by an analysis of how club affiliations mold
the available discourses on conservative social identities in relation to Trumpism. As we will
show, student-led groups represent a key arena in which discursive practices about the
presidency are developed and shared amongst peers.
It is important to note that none of our interviewees explicitly used true believer, satisficed
partisan, or principled rejecter to describe themselves. However, we find that they are valuable
analytic categories for capturing the everyday experiences of students trying to make sense of
Trumpism. At the same time, these orientations are ideal types. The lines between satisficers
and believers and between satisficers and rejecters are fuzzy and might even shift over time for
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the same individual. Our criteria are based on whether, in talking to us, respondents explicitly
aligned themselves with key tenets of the presidency (i.e., not only whether they approved of
Trump as a person, but how they described his accomplishments since taking office).
Additionally, we are not attempting to predict if our respondents will vote for Trump in the
future. Nor are we reporting on the actual voting choice made in 2016 (although, many
students chose to share this information). Instead, we are exploring how conservative club
members chose to orient themselves in relation to Trumpism when they had an opportunity to
account for their perspectives on the president and his administration.
Trumpism’s Principled Rejecters
A sizable portion of our conservative club subset—11 out of 26 respondents—felt a
strong antipathy toward Trumpism (see Table 1). These students found one or more
aspects of the presidency so reprehensible that they could not support the Republican
Party’s leader. Principled rejecters’ complaints were similar to those of their left-leaning
peers. For example, Sandra, a CR, explained, “I think Donald Trump, as a person, is
extremely divisive and unappealing, and some of his rhetoric [verges] on sexism and
homophobia, racism, etcetera. So, I really dislike him as a person. I think he has made
things a lot worse […].” Jerry, a member of a libertarian club, told us, “We hated Trump
[in our club] because, to us, he was kind of like a statist, fascist guy.” Like Sandra and
Jerry, a large majority of principled rejecters expressed their opposition in unambiguous
terms. However, these students did not necessarily support Hillary Clinton, either. For
some, that would have been a step too far. Many told us they cast their ballots for Gary
Johnson (the Libertarian candidate), Evan McMullin (a Never Trump Republican from
Utah), or even people not running for the office (such as writing in Mitt Romney).
Regardless of their ideological leanings, nearly everyone we interviewed described Trump’s
worldview as indecipherable. For example, we asked students to place the last six presidents
(along with other notable figures) on a scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.
Plotting Trump’s location in this way proved excessively difficult for most of our respondents.
As Ava, a CR, exclaimed when trying to fill out the diagram, “Oh goodness, I don’t know
where to put Donald Trump. […] I don’t think he actually understands the role of politics in
this country at all.” And Ava said this as someone who considers herself generally favorable to
the president. As a principled rejecter, Chloe, another CR, said, “I don’t even know what his
views are. I’m just going to put him dead in the center because […] the way he spends is not
conservative, but it’s also not liberal. I don’t know. He’s just ppttthh.” Ernest, a libertarian, told
us, “He’s kind of all over the place.”
Trump’s obtuse belief system is especially troubling for students more aligned with
libertarianism than party politics. As Ernest would go on to state, “Trump, I just never saw
as somebody who was, first of all, committed to a single platform. […He’s] definitely not
Table 1 Orientation to Trumpism
Principled rejecters 11
Supporters 15
True believers 6
Satisficed partisans 9
N 26
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somebody who’s firmly [supportive of] limited government.” In short, Ernest was bemoaning
Trump’s abandonment of first principles. Similarly, Steve, a founding member of Young
Americans for Liberty (YAL) at his school, was utterly miffed by Trump supporters joining
his group. “[…W]e have kids who yell and just don’t know what [being a] libertarian is. […
YAL] is supposed to attract people we can get along with: limited-government conservatives,
classical liberals, libertarians. And [these] guys are all just Trump supporters. No libertarian
would support Trump, I don’t think, unless it was completely in their financial interest to do
so.” In other words, Trumpism is for the naïve or the cynically self-interested. In either case,
for Steve, it was a nonstarter according to his purist views of libertarianism.
True Believers in the Presidency
At the other end of the conservative electorate are those who professed unconditional support
for the president and his administration. They might dislike certain aspects of Trump’s
behavior or take exception to particular stances, but they still remained steadfast boosters.
For instance, Layla, a CR, told us, “I think people are genuinely turned off by his use of
Twitter.” However, she also explained to us:
I’m behind Trump 100 percent, I would say. Yeah, I just think the amount that he has
accomplished since he has taken office has been pretty remarkable. What we’ve seen
with ISIS […] taking a hit, and with the economy, with the tax cuts, with families now
having more freedom to choose how they want to spend their own money when it comes
to paying for their children’s education—I think that’s remarkable.
Support from students like Layla extends beyond just picking Trump (as a Republican
candidate) over a Democrat.
Instead, much of what repels principled rejecters attracts true believers. As Ariel, a TPUSA
member, stated:
I think he’s good for the party because I think the party needed some shaking up. And I
think the party needed somebody to go in there and say, “Hey, we’re not going by X, Y,
Z anymore. We’re going to do it the way that we want and in a way that we see best fits.”
And I think Trump has rallied up a bunch of conservatives who were just like, “Eh, I’m
not going to vote; I don’t really care.”
The notion that the Republican Party “needed some shaking up” was a nearly universal theme
among true believers but virtually absent among our other interviewees (on this point, see
Wagner-Pacifici and Tavory 2017; also see Petersen et al., 2018). Take George. He started the
TPUSA chapter at his school as a means to support the Trump campaign. Citing his admiration
for figures like Pat Buchanan and Andrew Breitbart, George praised the president, “He stood
fast and defended himself, no matter what the accusation was. He just stood up for himself.”
That is, George liked the fact that Trump was willing to double down on the rhetoric that
students like Sandra found “divisive and unappealing.”
Overall, true believers made up slightly less than half of the Trump supporters we
interviewed. Out of our conservative club subset, 15 respondents were favorable toward the
president and, of these, six were inveterate Trump backers. On college campuses, therefore, it
would seem that if a politically-engaged student has the mettle to cheer on Trump, there is a
decent chance they will be full-throated about it. Miles, another TPUSA member, for example,
strode across his school’s grounds wearing a red Make America Great Again (MAGA) hat and
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a Trump t-shirt (which depicted the former reality TV star, amid explosions and a soaring bald
eagle, riding atop a gold-plated tank, wielding a rifle) on election day 2016. “I was expecting
to get harassed […on campus]. I almost didn’t wear the outfit. And then I’m like, ‘You know
what? This is America. We have a First Amendment. I’m wearing it.’”
The Satisficed Partisans of the Republican Party
Between the two poles of unwavering rejection and steadfast support is a group we call the
satisficed partisans. “Satisfice” represents a tension between something that satisfies and
something that merely suffices (Simon 1976). Satisficing is not about trying to maximize for
the best possible outcome but about making acceptable decisions from limited options. Thus,
while satisficed partisans find much of what Trump does problematic, they continue to choose
him over any possible Democratic alternative (although not, perhaps, over Republican chal-
lengers). Our interviewees who fit into this group are an especially good window for viewing
how conservatives think through their ideas about Trumpism—assessing the positives and
negatives using a heuristic of issue preferences and ideological identities (Mason 2018).
Satisficed partisans outnumbered true believers in our sample, with nine of 15 expressing
ambivalence about Trump.
Arlo is illustrative of the satisficing among CRs. In explaining his willingness to back
Trump, he repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the president. First, Arlo told us, “I’m
not the biggest Trump fan.” He then went on to tell us:
[…T]here’re a lot of times that Trump says something and you just want to duck your
head in the sand and ignore everything for the next media cycle. […] I think that,
morally, there’s a lot that Trump has done and said that make me question him as a
president a little bit. At the same time, if you look at the guy’s legislative achievements,
they’re pretty impressive as well. […H]ow do you judge the fact that he sends out a lot
of tweets that make you want to duck your head in the sand versus the tax cut, which is
going to bring [savings to the vast majority of] Americans and really help a lot of
people? By measuring those two things, at least in my opinion, the policies, a lot of
times, seem to outweigh the personal attributes of the president.
Similarly, McKenzie, another CR, told us she had felt certain Trump would win the White
House. “I knew right when he descended [on] the escalator: that man is going to be president.”
But, at the time of our interview, she also felt uncertainty about his presidency. “I’m struggling
with if I’m happy with the results or not.” That is, like Arlo, McKenzie was stuck trying to
balance the benefits of a Trump presidency with what she felt were his sizable costs
(“immaturity,” “lack of experience,” etc.).
In fact, as satisficed partisans, both Arlo and McKenzie claimed the ideal set-up going into
the 2020 election would be Trump withdrawing from the contest. But this preference was
tempered by their desire for a Republican victory. As Arlo explained, “[…I]n some ways I’d
like to see [Trump get challenged for the party’s nomination] because I have personality issues
with the president. But, at the same time, […] I’d like to see a Republican win [the general
election]. If we hurt that chance by having a bloody primary fight, that’s not good either.”
Likewise, Dante, a CR, unfavorably contrasted Trump to Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio. “During
the primaries, [Trump] wasn’t my candidate of choice. […] I resisted pretty long, in the sense
of wanting to get [a better nominee]. […] But then, at the same time, I’m not [of the mind] we
should try to replace him with another [candidate] right now. I’ve agreed with a lot of the stuff
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he [has done] during his first year.” The satisficing of Arlo, McKenzie, and Dante can be
contrasted with rejecters, who claimed to have cast their votes for candidates they knew could
not win in order to take a principled stand.
The Influence of Conservative Political Clubs on College Campuses
Having established the three-part typology of collegiate Trumpism, in this section we
analyze student-led groups’ influence over the discourses about the president and his
administration. First, we should note that it is reasonable to assume that conservatives in
the general population could also be broken down into rejecters, believers, and satisficers.
However, the percentage within each category would be different, as polls routinely show
support for the president to be far higher among registered Republicans than what we
found among right-leaning students involved with political clubs. This speaks to the fact
that universities simply do not provide a comfortable home for Trumpism. To help explain
this, we emphasize disunifying symbols. Unlike anchors, which link disparate themes
together, disunifying symbols agitate assumptions of shared meaning by bringing com-
peting practices and discourses into conflict. They reconfigure previously taken for
granted similarities into unignorable differences. Specifically, Trumpism unsettles the thin
coherence underlying conservative social identity, and this process is particularly acute in
political clubs operating on college campuses.
Whereas a theme of community building could tie together LGBT activists pursuing
otherwise divergent ends (Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011), the Trump presidency disrupts
the ideological détente within the American right. In place of a symbiosis of conservative ideas
(Perrin et al. 2014; see Himmelstein 1990), we find warring factions of rejecters and believers,
with satisficers wringing their hands over the consequences of their choices. Occupants within
each category position themselves as the proper defenders of what is now an even more
contested conservative social identity. And we argue that political clubs are integral to these
varied discursive practices. Which is to say, our analysis is not about isolated individuals
expressing unique viewpoints about the president and his administration. Our analysis is about
how clubs influence students’ orientations to Trumpism.
We hasten to add here, we are not arguing that Trumpism represents an existential threat to
the right flank in higher education. As noted above, there is (and will remain) a vibrant
community of meaning among conservatives. Anchors—forged out of symbols connected to
individualism, capitalism, and traditionalism—continue to cohere. Further, battles over strat-
egies and identities are part of every social movement (Ghaziani 2008)—especially among the
young and idealistic activists enrolled in universities (e.g., see Andrew 1997; Klatch 1999;
McAdam 1988). As such, we are studying Trumpism not only because it is singular, but
because it offers an opportunity to look at a more generic process of contention within culture.
Ironically, many of our interviewees stated that their clubs were not intended to be places
for hashing out fractious arguments. They may join to have a forum for friendly debate among
like-minded peers, but their groups are also valued “safe spaces” in which their conservative
positions should not require self-justifications (Kidder 2017). Hinting that the weight of
Trumpism (along with other disputes) was simply too much to ignore, Billy explained, “We,
as conservative organizations, don’t do a good enough job talking about our ideological
viewpoints. We have people really all across the spectrum of conservatism here, and we do
a pretty poor job of talking about that […].” The differences alluded to by Billy may not be
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addressed in the way he wanted, but our data show that students on the right are actually quite
adept at drawing distinctions between their groups vis-à-vis Trumpism—while also situating
their own identities in relation to the clubs on their campuses.
Sieve and Incubators for Campus Politics
Stevens et al. (2008) argue that in studies of higher education, universities are conceptualized
as sieves (by allowing only certain students to enter and graduate) and as incubators (by
nurturing new skills, knowledge, and ways of being among students). Such an analogy also
helps us to better understand political clubs. Student-led groups are sieves that filter through
only particular types of prospects (e.g., collegians who identify as Republicans may join CRs,
not College Democrats). But, once students are sorted, clubs shape particular social identities
in relation to the activism they promote. And initial members of CRs may eventually gravitate
to other clubs on campus, which better fit their ideologies and styles of activism.
Many collegians, of course, are not terribly interested in politics to begin with. In 2016 over
40% of entering freshman self-identified as “middle-of-the-road” (Eagan et al. 2017). Many of
these, we assume, have no strong activist bent. And for those who are more politically-
engaged, most are not coming from the ideological right (in that same survey, only about
22% identified as conservative or far-right). This is the first level of sorting. Most students
elect to not join political clubs at all, much less right-leaning ones. Then, for those that are
looking to be actively involved with conservative politics, clubs attract members through their
ideological positions: classical liberals, evangelical Christians, moderate Republicans, and so
on. This is the second level of sorting. Even holding beliefs constant, there is variance in how
students want to tackle political issues. Some want to take part in reasoned discussions with
their peers. Others want to meet politicians and gain experience working on campaigns. And a
certain portion relish the chance for confrontation with their fellow students. Thus, at the third
level, prospects are sorted—not only by ideology, but also by political tactics. To this point,
Binder and Wood (2013) distinguish between “civil,” “provocative,” “campaign-oriented,”
and “highbrow provocative” styles of conservative student activism. In joining clubs, there-
fore, would-be members have to consider just what type of activists they want to be, and which
clubs seem to give them opportunities to engage with their preferred style of activism.
Clubs, however, are not just containers that capture the fully formed activists filtered into
them. Rather, social groups have habits and customs that come to define interactions among
participants (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003). In other words, clubs are also incubators. The
activism styles of different groups actually help shape what types of political tactics members
come to view as appropriate and desirable (Binder and Wood 2013). While pre-existing
preferences attract or repel students to this or that club, once they become members, group-
styles normalize some practices while proscribing others. Perrin (2005) refers to this as
political microcultures, which constrain and enable different types of discourse. Further, this
is always a relational phenomenon. Club participants, Reyes (2015) points out, are aware of
what other student-led groups are doing on campus, and this knowledge influences their own
style preferences. As such, political clubs play a particularly important role in campus politics.
We can see this dual process of sorting and shaping in conservative clubs through students’
own accounts of their memberships. Specifically, true believers are likely to seek out and stay
in TPUSA, while principled rejecters are drawn to libertarian groups. The prominence and
storied history of CRs, meanwhile, appears to attract a mix of orientations (with satisficing
most common). Sometimes students join clubs only to become disillusioned—dropping out of
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the groups or moving on to different ones.7 However, for students who continue to participate
with a club and socialize with its members, their participation comes to influence their political
viewpoints. What might be a fringe perspective in one group is commonsense in another. We
have already seen hints of this in the preceding sections, but now we turn to this matter
directly. In doing so, we can see how struggles over social identity are intertwined with club
membership and the way Trumpism functions to disrupt the resonance between different
strands of conservatism.
The Microcultures of Political Clubs
TPUSA was founded in 2012, and for the last eight years their local chapters have found a
niche in being the brash conservative club on campuses, less willing than CRs to appease their
progressive classmates by tempering their rightist positions.8 As a national organization, it has
stepped onto the mainstage of politics in tandem with Trump’s ascendancy in the Republican
Party (Kotch 2017; Markay 2018; Rubenstein 2018). And TPUSA’s rise on campuses—
combined with its inflammatory tactics (Kolowich 2018; Olson 2018)—has upset established
right-leaning organizations operating in higher education, including Young America’s Foun-
dation (Wegmann 2018).
At the time we collected our data, four out of seven interviewees with a primary affiliation
in TPUSAwere true believers in Trumpism (see Table 2).9 This can be contrasted with a mere
two out of 14 of CRs and zero of five for libertarians. Miles offered a useful illustration of how
TPUSA sorts and shapes in relation to the presidency. We introduced Miles earlier in this paper
as the student who wore a MAGA hat and t-shirt with Trump atop a tank. In our interview,
Miles described his former self as a “traditional conservative.” He felt shunned by progressives
in the build-up to the 2016 election. He told the story of how his best friend cut social ties with
him after Miles posted a conservative political statement on social media. This ostracism,
though, only emboldened Miles’ transition into an extreme Trump supporter. “Afterward, I
started taking the attitude, ‘Okay, I’m going to be as political as I can on Facebook and just
clean house’ [i.e., intentionally offend those not already on the far-right].” And “That’s when I
actually started seeking out Turning Point.” Once in TPUSA, Miles found a small group of
equally fiery peers. This gave encouragement to Miles’ growing impulse to “clean house” on
Facebook but also, in the case of his university, to “take the underground conservative
counterculture and put it above ground.” To this end, Miles showed us flyers he was planning
to put up around school. They were all designed to infuriate liberal sensibilities. The most
provocative one mocked concern over police shootings of black men. Others criticized gun
7 It is worth noting here that unlike the sorting that happens in school admissions, in which students are either
filtered in or filtered out, the sieve of political clubs allows movement in both directions. Students can be sorted in
and then sort themselves out as they join other groups better aligned with their interests and dispositions.
8 Since we gathered our data, TPUSA has occasionally come under attack from individuals and groups further to
the right (e.g., see Coaston 2019). At our field sites, at the time we conducted our interviews, though, TPUSA
was considered the group on campus willing to stake out extreme positions and take risks in promoting them.
9 Politically engaged, right-leaning students are often members of multiple conservative clubs. As a CR, Sandra,
told us, “I would say a majority of conservatives on [campus] are members of CRs and they might additionally be
members of groups like [Young Americans for Freedom] or Turning Point, but I think we are still, as of right
now, anyway, the primary voice for conservatives [in college].” For the analysis offered in this paper, we focus
only on what we determined to be students’ primary affiliation, which we base on interviewees’ descriptions of
their personal involvements with their various clubs (e.g., holding an official position with a group or discussions
of social ties, time investment, etc.).
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regulations and social welfare efforts. While none of the flyers mentioned Trump by name,
they touched on popular talking points for the president.
Of the three TPUSA members who were not true believers in the president at the time of
our interviews, their dissatisfactions with Trumpism did not track completely with rejecters or
satisficers. For example, like other satisficed partisans, both Jaiden and Joaquin expressed
ambivalence towards the president and his administration when we talked with them. But each
had previously been firm backers. During the campaign, Jaiden unequivocally endorsed
Trump in his school’s paper while Joaquin attended a Trump speech and even went to the
president’s inauguration. Trevor, too, had been an ardent booster of Trump’s campaign, vocally
supporting the candidate on campus and attending rallies. However, he came off as a rejecter
when we talked—telling us he had become disillusioned with Trump’s ability to get things
done in Washington. Nevertheless, Trevor still embraced the populist core of Trumpism; he
just no longer had faith in the man for carrying out his agenda. In other words, our discussions
with TPUSA members revealed a strong connection between the club and an orientation of
belief in Trumpism.
CRs have been the must-join club for activists on the right for many decades. Both Karl
Rove and Grover Norquist famously got their starts with the organization. Of the 26 students in
our conservative club subset, 14 were primarily affiliated with CRs. Of these 14 CRs, seven
were satisficed partisans, while 5 were principled rejecters, and only two were true believers.
Thinking about the influence of CRs on its members, Dante’s story is instructive. We discussed
Dante above, in relation to his desire to not see Trump primaried, despite his lukewarm
assessment of the president. Dante told us how he appreciated the serious approach to politics
taken by CRs. And he contrasted that with the “trolling type of stuff” done by TPUSA
(exemplified by Miles’ flyers).
As a member of CRs, Dante was exposed to a variety of conservative viewpoints—
many of which challenged his previous assumptions about what a conservative should
and should not support.
College Republicans attract a wide ideology[. There are] people across the conservative
spectrum, and, more specifically, [I mean with regards to] President Trump and [what]
conservatism [should be]. There is a group message [board] with a bunch of [CRs]
where there are a lot of arguments over what Trump did. So, being there has helped
extend my views on that issue. […] I definitely think coming into college, I was […] less
knowledgeable. A lot of it was just, “I’ll fall [along] party lines” in a sense [of being a]
Republican. […A] lot of the [executive] board members [for the club] are not big Trump
people here […]. […T]hey gave me the norm that it’s okay to be a Republican and be
critical of [Trump]. […] I think being able to [see…] the president of College Repub-
licans criticize Trump on somethings, [I realized] it’s okay to criticize Trump on stuff. I
don’t have to follow party lines.
Table 2 Orientation to Trump by Primary Club Affiliation
Principled rejecters True believers Satisficed partisans N
College Republicans (CRs) 5 2 7 14
Turning Point USA (TPUSA) 1 4 2 7
Libertarian groups 5 0 0 5
N 11 6 9 26
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In short, Dante came to school believing a “conservative” should simply back the Republican
Party. Through CRs, though, Dante came to see principled rejection as an equally valid
position for someone on the right. As such, Dante—like many members—came down
somewhere in the middle. He acknowledged his displeasure with Trump’s flaws, but also
wanted to be pragmatic about America’s political system. Which is to say, if Dante wanted
Republican policies signed into law, Trump appeared to be the best choice among flawed
options (on this point, also see Pierson 2017), and the CR club he belonged to gave him ample
opportunity to work out his ideas.
CRs often prided themselves as being—to use Sandra’s words—“pragmatic about what
they want [their] organization to be.” As Billy explained about his chapter’s decision to not
bring firebrand speaker, Milo Yiannopoulos, to campus, “I think it was justified by the
executive board at the time as a pragmatic concern. […] ‘We don’t want that stigma. We
don’t want to be the group that brought Milo.’ Turning Point, they want to be the group that
brought Milo.” Demonstrating the relational dynamic among clubs on campus (Reyes 2015),
Billy was fully aware of his membership options. Echoing this sentiment, Silas said of CRs,
“We’re not here to fight. We’re here to solve problems. If you want to fight, go somewhere
else. Turning Point is right over there.”Which is to say, for CRs, TPUSA has become a foil for
what is wrong with conservatism. As a further example, Chloe conceded that TPUSA has
“cool stickers,” with slogans like “socialism sucks,” but she also felt the club was
“counteracting the work we were doing [to show a more open and diverse party].” And she
expanded, “Usually, Turning Point USA’s approach, to us, felt like it was uninviting, and we’re
like, ‘Can you please not stand next to us?’ Like, ‘[CRs] want people to [come to our events].”
George’s explanation for why he started a TPUSA chapter at his school speaks to the
flipside of this perspective, with TPUSA members critiquing CRs.
So, when Trump was going to run in 2016, I went out and campaigned for him on
campus. I was one of only three or four people who did […]. I don’t see any leadership
from the College Republicans for doing any type of activism work on campus or trying
to persuade anyone [to vote for Trump] or get people riled up to go out and do stuff. I felt
like there was a need for that. […CRs] don’t really like to be controversial at all. They
just kind of stick to themselves […].
That is, the satisficed partisanship of CRs (much less the principled rejection of some
members) did not provide the sort of enthusiasm for Trumpism that George was looking for
in a political club. As a result, he turned to the resources provided by the national office of
TPUSA to start his own club.
While there was a strong contingent of principled rejecters in CRs, members of the
libertarian clubs we interviewed were unanimous in denouncing Trumpism. For example,
we previously noted Ernest’s critique of the president and his administration for not adhering
to an ideological platform. However, Ernest also told us how in high school he had been a
“pretty mainstream Republican. At one point I actually bought a Reagan-Bush shirt.”10 But,
even before coming to college, he started shifting towards more libertarian ideals. “I started
having doubts about certain things, like the military and marijuana. I started looking into it
more.” It is this inquisitiveness that led him to join a libertarian club. “I was definitely not as
10 Ronald Reagan has been beatified among younger Republicans, and campaign shirts from the 1984 election
have become conservative chic in recent years. In telling us this, Ernest is positioning his former self as a typical
Republican, not a true (free-thinking) libertarian.
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libertarian as I am now, when I came to college. That was influenced by my friends in Students
for Individual Liberty [SIL].” Ernest also contrasted the provocations of TPUSA with his
political outlook. “I would say […] Turning Point [is] just as disconnected from my views as
those on the left.” Instead, SIL members prided themselves on having serious intellectual
discussions (e.g., inviting scholars from the Cato Institute to give talks).
In fact, more than just promoting a cerebral environment, libertarian club members often
described a desire for intellectual sparring. On this point, Hugh explained, “Thankfully, […] we’re
willing to bash literally anyone and everyone. […] We are willing to see the flaws in our own
arguments, in our own movement, and address them.” In the context of our interview, Hugh’s
description of being “willing to bash” other viewpoints was couched in an academic mindset of
reasoned debate. And the product of this intellectualism was one in which Trumpism was simply
outside the realm of serious conservative thought. This is also why Steve (quoted above) was so
bothered by Trump supporters joining YAL. From Steve’s perspective, they just wanted to “yell”
rightwing talking points. They did not want to get into philosophical expositions on the true nature
of conservatism, as he envisioned the members of the club should be doing.
Conclusion
Using the three types of political clubs featured in this paper, we can see the significant role
student-led groups play in supporting or resisting Trumpism on college campuses. TPUSA has
led the charge in advocating for a more provocative, populist-oriented conservatism—one with
President Trump at the very center of campus chapters’ practices and discourses. Alternatively,
CRs have been riven by Trumpism. Pragmatism dominates among our CR respondents, but it
is an uneasy position to be in. To quote Arlo again, “you just want to duck your head in the
sand.” The students associated primarily with libertarian clubs, by contrast, were comfortable
in denouncing the presidency outright. However, their groups were also largely removed from
electoral politics, and their dislike of Trump was mostly academic.11
Ultimately, our interviews with members of political clubs on college campuses allowed for
what Zussman (1996) calls “autobiographical occasions.” In asking a variety of questions
about activism, politics, and college life, we provided a context for students to develop self-
narratives. Among right-leaning collegians, such discussions were mostly about asserting a
valued portrayal of their conservative social identity (Gross et al. 2011). And respondents’
orientations to Trumpism was a prominent component of how students attempted to position
themselves in relation to others on the right.
We talked to principled rejecters who joined their left-leaning peers in condemning the
president and his administration. But we also heard from supporters of the presidency. True
believers embraced the shake-up promised by Trumpism, while satisficed partisans touted
being pragmatic about the limits of the US electoral process. More important than the typology
of Trumpism itself is our analysis of political clubs’ influence on orienting members toward
distinct positions about the president and his administration. Groups have styles (Eliasoph and
11 Libertarian students’ withdrawal from electoral politics is not necessarily the position of the national
organizations that help sponsor their groups on campuses. YAL, for example, supports a highly orchestrated
student mobilization effort to help chosen candidates in local and state races (known as Operation Win at the
Door). However, campaigning (especially for traditional Republican politicians) was not a key interest among the
libertarians in our sample. If anything, participation in these groups appears to promote an intellectual cynicism
toward electoral politics.
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Lichterman 2003), which mold the political discourses of participants (Binder and Wood 2013;
Reyes 2015). We show the sorting and shaping of clubs by examining the rejection found in
libertarian groups, the belief in TPUSA, and the satisficing in CRs. Each club exerted pressure
on participants by providing “social environments that […] offer different resources for
political thought and action” (Perrin 2005, 1050).
For anyone interested in (or concerned about) American democracy, the influence of
political clubs on campuses is a crucial consideration because these groups are not managed
by students alone. Activism, especially on the right, is funded by deep-pocketed donors
(Mayer 2016) and supported through a network of national organizations (Binder 2017;
Binder and Wood 2013). This investment has become part of a battle over the heart and soul
of the Republican Party. Universities are one of the epicenters for the conflict. Many of the
students we interviewed have already been foot soldiers in the fight; some will go on to
become commanders. As such, what is happening inside political clubs today on campuses is a
part of what will define American politics at large tomorrow.
Our future research—pulling from our full sample—will address the role of national organiza-
tions in campus politics (for the left and the right). In this paperwe have provided a preliminary step
by shedding new light on collegiate conservatism. Specifically, we have analyzed Trumpism as a
divider of the right. In making their identity claims, club members frequently referenced the
presidency. It was used as a symbol—not to anchor disparate constituencies (Ghaziani and
Baldassarri 2011) but one—that agitated differences. Researchers need to grapple with the
concurrence of cultural anchors and disunifying symbols. Nothing in our argument negates the
fact that many themes continue to unite students on the right. For our respondents, personal
independence, the power of free markets, and the value of tradition helped bond members of
various clubs together. But there were also themes that disrupted this unity, and Trumpism stands
out in our interviews as generating a great deal of contentious identity talk among conservatives.
Further, symbols of disunity are not unique to students on the right. While we do not have
space to analyze progressives in this paper, they too inhabit contested communities of meaning.
Themes of multiculturalism and social justice, for example, pull left-leaning students into a sense
of ideological alignment. Conversely, free speech—once a prominent anchor for progressives—
has become a fracture point between liberals and radicals (e.g., see Moskowitz 2019). Which is
to say, collegians on the left are increasingly divided over the meaning of “free speech” and how
it relates to their shared values of equality. As with Trump for conservatives, disagreements over
free speech for progressives is about more than any one policy decision or a single speaker. It has
become a rift in what it should mean to occupy the left side of the ideological spectrum.
At the same time, the symbolic power of free speech to disunify the left seems less robust—
in our current data, at least. As such, in this paper, we have focused on the ways conservatives
discussed the president and his administration. During the first full year Trump occupied the
Oval Office (i.e., the time we conducted our interviews), Trumpism on college campuses
offered a unique opportunity for studying the boundaries of thin coherence. To be a rejecter,
believer, or satisficer required (and, presumably, still requires) drawing from competing
discourses of what a conservative social identity means—discourses molded by the microcul-
tures in which students are embedded. Of course, there is nothing new or surprising about
divisiveness within social movements. In the data we have presented, though, we see how
Trumpism was actually used in students’ images of self and—most crucially—how this
identity talk was intertwined with club memberships.
We also believe there is a great deal of potential for researchers to build on the groundwork
we have laid in this paper. Thinking not only of anchors, but also of the ways cultural meanings
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become unmoored, helps us better understand an increasingly complex political landscape.
Moving forward, sociologists need to explore symbolic disunity in other aspects of social
movements, as well as in the quotidian beliefs of ordinary citizens. Appreciating both the thin
coherence of culture along with the limits of individuals and groups to find common cause will
enrich the analyses we have to offer on how contemporary democracies actually function. And,
as we have attempted to highlight in this paper, group memberships—along with the activism
styles they encourage—play a significant role in what political engagement entails.
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